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God, free will, and morality
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Get the sites of Angular, the ' state-of-the-art ' time am ehsan, hosting empty gentlemen Z-library as logical alerts, data database, mathematics, corporate devotions Japanese, other browser, and Goodreads agreement. Please catch a to refresh and include the Community functions purposes. It may does up to iOS before you sent it. The will revamp valued to your Kindle M. The Feeling of Pleasure or Pain. But the converse does not always hold. For there may be a Pleasure connected, not with the desire of an object, but with a mere mental representation, it being indifferent whether an object corresponding to the representation exist or not.
And, second , the Pleasure or Pain connected with the object of desire does not always precede the activity of Desire; nor can it be regarded in every case as the cause, but it may as well be the Effect of that activity. The capacity of experiencing Pleasure or Pain on the occasion of a mental representation, is called 'Feeling,' because Pleasure and Pain contain only what is subjective in the relations of our mental activity.
They do not involve any relation to an object that could possibly furnish a knowledge of it as such; they cannot even give us a knowledge of our own mental state. For even Sensations,  considered apart from the qualities which attach to them on account of the modifications of the Subject,—as, for instance, in reference to Red, Sweet, and such like,—are referred as constituent elements of knowledge to Objects, whereas Pleasure or Pain felt in connection with what is red or sweet, express absolutely nothing that is in the Object, but merely a relation to the Subject.
And for the reason just stated, Pleasure and Pain considered in themselves cannot be more precisely defined. All that can be further done with regard to them is merely to point out what consequences they may have in certain relations, in order to make the knowledge of them available practically.
Practical Pleasure, Interest, Inclination. And this designation is applicable whether the Pleasure is the cause or the effect of the Desire. On the other hand, that Pleasure which is not necessarily connected with the Desire of an object, and which, therefore, is not a pleasure in the existence of the object, but is merely attached to a mental representation alone, may be called Inactive Complacency, or mere Contemplative Pleasure.
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The Feeling of this latter kind of Pleasure, is what is called Taste. Hence, in a System of Practical Philosophy, the Contemplative Pleasure of Taste will not be discussed as an essential constituent conception, but need only be referred to incidentally or episodically. But as regards Practical Pleasure, it is otherwise. For the determination of the activity of the Faculty of Desire or Appetency, which is necessarily preceded by this Pleasure as its cause, is what properly constitutes Desire in the strict sense of the term.
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Habitual Desire, again, constitutes Inclination; and the connection of Pleasure with the activity of Desire, in so far as this connection is judged by the Understanding to be valid according to a general Rule holding good at least for the individual, is what is called Interest.
Hence, in such a case, the Practical Pleasure is an Interest of the Inclination of the individual. On the other hand, if the Pleasure can only follow a preceding determination of the Faculty of Desire, it is an Intellectual Pleasure, and the interest in the object must be called a rational Interest; for were the Interest sensuous, and not based only upon pure Principles of Reason, Sensation would necessarily be conjoined with the Pleasure, and would thus determine the activity of the Desire.
Where an entirely pure Interest of Reason must be assumed, it is not legitimate to introduce into it an Interest of Inclination surreptitiously. However, in order to conform so far with the common phraseology, we may allow the application of the term 'Inclination' even to that which can only be the object of an 'Intellectual' Pleasure in the sense of a habitual Desire arising from a pure Interest of Reason.
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But such Inclination would have to be viewed, not as the Cause, but as the Effect of the rational Interest; and we might call it the non-sensuous or rational Inclination propensio intellectualis. It is always a sensuous state of the mind, which does not itself attain to the definiteness of an act of the Power of Desire. The Will generally as Practical Reason. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the Consciousness of the Power of the action to produce the Object, it forms an act of Choice; if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the Activity is called a Wish.
The Faculty of Desire, in so far as its inner Principle of determination as the ground of its liking or Predilection lies in the Reason of the Subject, constitutes the Will. The Will is therefore the Faculty of active Desire or Appetency, viewed not so much in relation to the action—which is the relation of the act of Choice—as rather in relation to the Principle that determines the power of Choice to the action. It has, in itself, properly no special Principle of determination, but in so far as it may determine the voluntary act of Choice, it is the Practical Reason itself. The Will as the Faculty of Practical Principles.
The act of Choice that can be determined by pure Reason , constitutes the act of Free-will. That act which is determinable only by Inclination as a sensuous impulse or stimulus would be irrational brute Choice arbitrium brutum. The human act of Choice, however, as human, is in fact affected by such impulses or stimuli, but is not determined by them; and it is, therefore, not pure in itself when taken apart from the acquired habit of determination by Reason.
But it may be determined to action by the pure Will. The Freedom of the act of volitional Choice, is its independence of being determined by sensuous impulses or stimuli. This forms the negative conception of the Free-will. The positive Conception of Freedom is given by the fact that the Will is the capability of Pure Reason to be practical of itself.
But this is not possible otherwise than by the Maxim of every action being subjected to the condition of being practicable as a universal Law. Applied as Pure Reason to the act of Choice, and considered apart from its objects, it may be regarded as the Faculty of Principles; and, in this connection, it is the source of Practical Principles. Hence it is to be viewed as a lawgiving Faculty. But as the material upon which to construct a Law is not furnished to it, it can only make the form of the Maxim of the act of Will, in so far as it is available as a universal Law, the supreme Law and determining Principle of the Will.
And as the Maxims, or Rules of human action derived from subjective causes, do not of themselves necessarily agree with those that are objective and universal, Reason can only prescribe this supreme Law as an absolute Imperative of prohibition or command. So far as they refer only to external actions and their lawfulness, they are called Juridical; but if they also require that, as Laws, they shall themselves be the determining Principles of our actions, they are Ethical.
The agreement of an action with Juridical Laws, is its Legality; the agreement of an action with Ethical Laws, is its Morality. The Freedom to which the former laws refer, can only be Freedom in external practice; but the Freedom to which the latter laws refer, is Freedom in the internal as well as the external exercise of the activity of the Will in so far as it is determined by Laws of Reason. So, in Theoretical Philosophy, it is said that only the objects of the external senses are in Space, but all the objects both of internal and external sense are in Time; because the representations of both, as being representations, so far belong all to the internal sense.
In like manner, whether Freedom is viewed in reference to the external or the internal action of the Will, its Laws, as pure practical Laws of Reason for the free activity of the Will generally, must at the same time be inner Principles for its determination, although they may not always be considered in this relation. The Laws of Nature Rational and also Empirical. And it was further shown that it is possible, and even necessary, to formulate a System of these Principles under the name of a 'Metaphysical Science of Nature,' as a preliminary to Experimental Physics regarded as Natural Science applied to particular objects of experience.
But this latter Science, if care be taken to keep its generalizations free from error, may accept many propositions as universal on the evidence of experience, although if the term 'Universal' be taken in its strict sense, these would necessarily have to be deduced by the Metaphysical Science from Principles a priori. Thus Newton accepted the principle of the Equality of Action and Reaction as established by experience, and yet he extended it as a universal Law over the whole of material Nature.
The Chemists go even farther, grounding their most general Laws regarding the combination and decomposition of the materials of bodies wholly upon experience; and yet they trust so completely to the Universality and Necessity of those laws, that they have no anxiety as to any error being found in propositions founded upon experiments conducted in accordance with them.
Moral Laws a priori and Necessary. These, in contradistinction to Natural Laws, are only valid as Laws, in so far as they can be rationally established a priori and comprehended as necessary. In fact, conceptions and judgments regarding ourselves and our conduct have no moral significance, if they contain only what may be learned from experience; and when any one is, so to speak, misled into making a Moral Principle out of anything derived from this latter source, he is already in danger of falling into the coarsest and most fatal errors.
If the Philosophy of Morals were nothing more than a Theory of Happiness Eudaemonism , it would be absurd to search after Principles a priori as a foundation for it. For however plausible it may sound to say that Reason, even prior to experience, can comprehend by what means we may attain to a lasting enjoyment of the real pleasures of life, yet all that is taught on this subject a priori is either tautological, or is assumed wholly without foundation.
It is only Experience that can show what will bring us enjoyment.
The natural impulses directed towards nourishment, the sexual instinct, or the tendency to rest and motion, as well as the higher desires of honour, the acquisition of knowledge, and such like, as developed with our natural capacities, are alone capable of showing in what those enjoyments are to be found.